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By Roger Bernhardt and
Robert L. Kehr

I

n the past few months, two California decisions have made strong
statements to lawyers about improper behavior in handling real estate matters for their clients. One such case is concerned with going
into business with a client while representing the client and the other
case addresses supporting the other side after the termination of the client’s representation.
Fair v. Bakhtiari
In the first of these cases, Fair v. Bakhtiari, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 765 (Ct. App.
2011), a lawyer who had represented a client for about six months then
went into business with him. The two of them made real estate investments together and shared the profits; the client provided the money
and the lawyer negotiated and drafted documents. Their enterprise
lasted about 10 years (although the lawyer continued to practice at a
law firm for the first four years of their joint venture) and ended badly
when the client terminated their business relationship. The lawyer filed
suit against the client for the value of the lawyer’s interest in their jointly
owned businesses and for other claims, including assault and battery,
and the client cross-complained for, among other things, breach of
fiduciary duty. After a bifurcated trial, the court found that the lawyer
had violated two California standards. One was California Rule of
Professional Conduct 3-300, which, like ABA Model Rule 1.8(a), requires
that a lawyer—before entering into a business transaction with a client—advise the client in writing and give the client the opportunity to
get advice from independent counsel on the situation. The second was
the statutory presumption, found in Cal. Prob. Code § 16004, that the
lawyer (or other fiduciary) that enters into a transaction with a client (or
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beneficiary) has the burden of proving
that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the client. The lawyer failed
to overcome this burden, although the
investment venture was very profitable. In light of those findings, the trial
court rejected the lawyer’s request to
amend his complaint to seek a monetary recovery from the client and the
businesses on a quantum meruit basis
for all the services the lawyer had performed during their shared career (over
and above what he had already taken
out of the venture as compensation,
profit sharing, and benefits). The appellate opinion affirmed that conclusion,
holding that the lawyer’s misconduct
disqualified him from demanding any
further compensation from the client.
Does this decision mean that a
lawyer cannot invest in a business
deal with his or her real estate client?
No, but the decision is a cautionary
tale about the civil consequences for
a lawyer who gets the rules wrong.
Because this lawyer failed to meet his
burden of showing that the transactions
with clients were fair and reasonable to
the clients, the lawyer lost his ownership interest in the businesses (a series
of real estate investments in which the
lawyer was a partner), despite the lawyer’s years of work as an active partner
in the businesses. He was permitted
to retain all of his prior compensation
(which the former clients did not seek
to recover), but he was denied the right
to obtain quantum meruit compensation for the services he had provided to
the investment entities.
Is this a standard peculiar to
California? The rule now stated in Cal.
Prob. Code § 16004 has long been part
of California statutory law, but it is
based on common law considerations
that exist even where there is no such
codification. For example, the Indiana
Supreme Court has stated that “Indiana
case law recognizes that transactions
entered into during the existence of a fiduciary relationship are presumptively
invalid as the product of undue influence. Transactions between a lawyer
and client are presumed to be fraudulent, so that the lawyer has the burden
of proving the fairness and honesty
thereof.” In re Smith, 572 N.E.2d 1280,

1285 (Ind. 1991), cited with approval
in Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178, 184
(Ind. 2007). See also In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against McMullen, 896 P.2d
1281, 1290 (Wash. 1995); Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 126.
Suppose the lawyer does not
invest funds in the client’s project but
instead agrees to take a piece of the action in lieu of fees for doing the legal
work? It is widely recognized that the
business transaction rules do not apply
for either civil or disciplinary purposes
when a client hires a lawyer under a
traditional hourly, flat, contingency, or
mixed fee arrangement. But a lawyer’s
fee agreement is subject to the business transaction rules when the lawyer
obtains an ownership, possessory, or
security interest adverse to the client.
One example of the rules is the lawyer’s obtaining an ownership interest
in the client’s company or in a client’s
asset as compensation for legal services.
This example is explicit in Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 126, Reporter’s Note, cmt. a,
which cites several published appellate
opinions to that effect. The same conclusion has been reached in a number
of advisory ethics opinions, including
ABA Formal Op. 00-418 (July 7, 2000).
The Fair decision does not rely on any
distinction between investing with a client and obtaining an ownership interest
in return for providing legal services.
Will the Lawyer Always
Go Unpaid?
Can a lawyer who goes into business with a client obtain compensation for services provided to the client
or to the client’s business entity? The
opinion in Fair provides a starting point
for an answer in California. The issue
on appeal was whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the
lawyer’s motion to amend its complaint
to add a claim for the reasonable value
of his services. Fair, however, does
not provide a definite answer to other
factual situations that might be raised
in later cases. In Fair, the appellate
court found that under the aggravated
factual circumstances presented, the
trial court had not abused its discretion

in denying the motion to amend.
Among other things, the lawyer failed
to document many of the transactions
he sought to enforce; the parties had
disagreed over time about the terms of
their deal. In addition, the lawyer failed
to provide any advice to his clients
regarding the transactions despite the
continued existence of a lawyer-client
relationship; and the lawyer had unresolved conflicts. One conflict was that
the lawyer represented multiple clients
(including the individual client and numerous business entities), and another
stemmed from the lawyer’s financial
interest in the transactions on which
he provided legal services. The lawyer failed to comply with the conflict
disclosure and consent requirements
of California’s Rules of Professional
Conduct for both sets of conflicts. It is
possible that a lawyer might succeed in
obtaining compensation in less extreme
settings, even if the lawyer fails to meet
the burden of showing that the transactions were fair, reasonable, and fully
explained to the client. Still, a lawyer
seeking quantum meruit compensation
will have an uphill battle. The reason
is that the court refused to apply the
doctrine of severance (a common law
principle, codified in Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1599, that permits a court to sever the
invalid part of a contract and enforce
the portions that are valid), and accordingly the lawyer’s failure to prove
that the transactions were fair, reasonable, and fully explained, permitted
the clients to void the transactions
in their entirety. The trial court’s key
finding was that all of the lawyer’s
services were “part and parcel of those
unenforceable business transactions.”
Fair, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783. There
might be other situations, however, in
which a court would permit a client
to void a transaction but nevertheless
see at least some of the lawyer’s legal
or nonlegal services as distinguishable
from the void transaction and therefore compensable.
Is the client’s right to void the entire transaction peculiar to California,
or will lawyers in other jurisdictions
face the same potential outcome? The
client’s right to void the entire transaction comes from the common law and
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is not unique to California. See, e.g.,
DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc.,
755 A.2d 757, 770–71 (R.I. 2000); Tyson
v. Moore, 613 So. 2d 817, 823–24 (Miss.
1992); and Security Federal Sav. & Loan
Ass’n of Nashville v. Riviera, Ltd., 856
S.W.2d 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). This
right of avoidance can be seen as an
expression of the norms that a fiduciary
ordinarily may not retain any of the
profits that arise from a breach of fiduciary duty and that an agent may be
required to deliver to the principal any
benefit acquired through the misuse of
the agent’s position. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 874, cmt. b (1979);
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.02,
cmt. e (2006); and Note, Sanctions for
Attorney’s Representation of Conflicting
Interests, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 994, 1004–06
(1957).
Will lawyers outside of California
face the same problem in attempting
to obtain compensation for services
when a transaction is held to be void?
The authors are not aware of any case
from outside California that directly
addresses whether a lawyer can secure
compensation for services to a joint
business with a client when the lawyer
cannot otherwise enforce a related
transaction. The court in Fair viewed
the issues from a contract standpoint,
but other starting points might be
used by different courts. The issue
might be viewed from the standpoint
of agency, fiduciary duty, or lawyer’s
conflict of interest.
Is there any way for a lawyer to
safely go into business with a client
and enforce the compensation features of the deal? The safest course is
for the lawyer to comply fully with the
business transaction rule (Rule 3-300
in California and Rule 1.8(a) under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
Doing so should allow the lawyer to
meet the burden of proving that the
transaction was fair and reasonable
to the client. Compliance means that
(1) the agreement between the lawyer
and client is fully stated in writing in a
form that the client reasonably should
be able to understand, (2) the lawyer
advises the client in writing to seek
independent counsel and gives the
client time to seek that advice, (3) the
62
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client agrees to the deal in writing, and
(4) the lawyer provides the client all the
advice the lawyer would have given if
not a party to the deal. The obligation
to competently advise the client about
the transaction long has been part of
California law and received its most famous statement in Felton v. Le Breton, 28
P. 490, 493–94 (Cal. 1892). Accord In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against McMullen, 896 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Wash. 1995).
The difficulty of complying with the
business transaction rule depends on
the nature of the transaction. Imagine,
as an example, that a lawyer wants to
buy a client’s used car for the use of
the lawyer’s teenager. It would not be
complicated for the lawyer to satisfy
all of the requirements of the applicable business transaction rule in an
isolated transaction of that sort. The
documentation would be simple and
the fair value of the used car easy to
determine. The transaction in Fair was
at the opposite end of the spectrum.
There, the lawyer and the client entered
into a real estate investment business.
Rather than a simple, isolated transaction, the lawyer and the client entered
into a series of complex and interrelated
business transactions with one another
for which they formed a series of entities over time. In practice the buying,
financing, operating, and selling of real
estate breaks down into a great number
of individual but interrelated transactions. When the lawyer and client work
side by side, day after day, in an active
real estate investment or development
program, a requirement that the lawyer
comply with the business transaction
rule for each new contract or contract
modification would place an extraordinary compliance burden on the lawyer.
Quitting as Counsel First?
Could the lawyer avoid the business transaction requirements by
terminating the lawyer-client relationship before entering into the
joint venture? Although worthy of
consideration, this solution has practical problems. The lawyer might have
been invited into the real estate project
precisely because the lawyer would
contribute legal services, as was the
case in Fair. The client testified that he

agreed to give the lawyer a 30% ownership
interest because the lawyer contributed his
legal expertise, and the lawyer was found
to have represented both the business entities and the individual client after that time.
It would be a significant protective step
for the lawyer to clearly and unambiguously terminate the lawyer-client relationship
before entering into any business transaction with a client and then to carefully
avoid any conduct that the former client
reasonably might understand to mean that
the lawyer-client relationship had been reestablished. By itself, however, termination
does not provide the lawyer with immunity. Although the business transaction rule
by its terms applies to business transactions
“with a client,” case law in California has
applied this rule to situations in which
the relationship of trust and confidence
has continued after the termination of the
lawyer-client relationship. The continuance
of the relationship of trust and confidence
is more likely when the business transaction is related to the subject of the former
relationship or involves information that
the lawyer obtained as a result of the former representation. There is some similar
authority on this point from outside California. The application of ABA Model Rule
1.8(a) to transactions with former clients is
explicit in the Connecticut version of the
rule, and the same result might be obtained
through trust concepts. See Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 170, cmt. g.
Obtaining “Independent Approval”
Can the lawyer in the lawyer-client
venture recommend the name of a prospective second lawyer to satisfy the independent approval requirement; would the
second lawyer have to be in a different
law firm; and who pays the fees of the
second lawyer? Cal. Rule 3-300 and Model
Rule 1.8(a) require the lawyer in the lawyer–client venture to recommend that the
client seek independent advice and to give
the client time to obtain that advice. In a
situation of any complexity or magnitude,
such as in Fair, it would be prudent for
the lawyer to refuse to proceed unless the
client actually obtains independent legal
advice. Model Rule 1.8(a) and Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 126 do not address the factors that make a
lawyer “independent.”
Common sense would dictate that the

second lawyer not be in the same law
firm with, or be paid by, the first lawyer
and should not have a close personal
or professional relationship with the
first lawyer that might cause independence to be questioned. It is probably
best if the client selects the independent
lawyer without any input from the first
lawyer, but this practice is not required.
California’s proposed new Rules of
Professional Conduct (on which the supreme court has not yet ruled) have the
following explanation: “An independent lawyer is a lawyer who (i) does
not have a financial interest in the transaction or acquisition, (ii) does not have
a close legal, business, financial, professional or personal relationship with the
lawyer seeking the client’s consent, and
(iii) represents the client with respect to
the transaction or acquisition.” California State Bar, Petition Request That
the State Bar of California Approve New
California Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 1.8.8, cmt. 13, http://ethics.calbar.
ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=sOY6
VmyQx7s%3d&tabid=2669 (last visited
Dec. 29, 2011).
The lawyer proposing to go into
business with the client certainly may
provide the client with the names of
other lawyers to provide needed advice
about the proposed transaction, but the
original lawyer should not even appear
to have selected the second lawyer.
The role of independent counsel is
to provide competent and unbiased
advice to the client about the proposed
transaction. For the second lawyer to
counsel the client about the pros and
cons of the proposed transaction and
the reasonably available alternatives
and their pros and cons, the second
lawyer will likely want to discuss the
situation with the first lawyer to better
understand the genesis of the nature
and form of the proposed transaction. It
also is possible that this discussion will
lead to negotiations between the two
lawyers about the substance or form of
the transaction.
Should the original lawyer consult
with an ethics expert about the proposed deal? The business transaction
rules set out protocols that any lawyer
should be able to follow. The greater
problem is that the lawyer might not

recognize the need to comply with the
rule. Some lawyers may be unable to
recognize that they need to comply
with the business transaction rule,
when their own commercial interests
are at risk, though this requirement
would have been apparent if they were
advising or observing the conduct of
another lawyer.
Further Obligations?
If a business agreement is ultimately approved by independent counsel,
is the original lawyer subject to any
ongoing further restraints because of
his former status? The answer depends
on the nature of the transaction. If the
lawyer had purchased a used car from
a client, it is difficult to see how there
would be any later interaction between
the lawyer and client about that transaction. When a lawyer is in business
with a current client, however, the
lawyer must be mindful of the business
transactions requirements each time the
lawyer and the client enter into a new or
modified agreement with one another.
The lawyer also must be certain that the
business relationship and the lawyer’s
financial interests do not affect the full
performance of all of the lawyer’s duties to the client and must comply with
any other applicable conflict rules.
Is the relative sophistication of the
lawyer and the client important in a
business transactions situation? In determining whether a business transaction is fair and reasonable to the client
and therefore is enforceable by the
lawyer, there is a long case-law tradition of examining the client’s sophistication. The less sophisticated the client,
the heavier the burden on the lawyer
to demonstrate the procedural and
substantive conscionability of the transaction. The lawyer’s relative sophistication was mentioned by the court
in Fair, but the fiduciary nature of the
relationship itself creates a presumption
of the lawyer’s relative sophistication. It
is possible the court gave some added
weight to the fact that the lawyer was a
licensed real estate broker, but it is hard
to imagine that the outcome would
have been any different if the lawyer
had not also been a licensed broker. The
decision hinged on the lawyer’s status

as lawyer, his lawyer-client relationships with the individual client and the
various entities they formed, and the
lawyer’s failure to meet the burden of
showing that the transactions were fair
and reasonable and fully explained to
the clients.
The obvious civil risks for a lawyer
who goes into business with a client
are the possible inability to enforce the
transaction and the possible inability
to be compensated for services to the
business. There is also the danger that,
when a lawyer obtains an ownership
interest in a business, at least in part
because the lawyer promises to provide legal services to the business, the
lawyer might feel obligated to provide
services outside the lawyer’s area of experience. The potential for malpractice
liability is real in situations of this kind.
A lawyer might think of himself only
as one of the principals in the business,
but he nevertheless owes all of the duties that lawyers owe to clients. Related
to this consideration are the questions of whether the lawyer will carry
malpractice insurance and whether the
insurance will protect the lawyer who
is doing business with a client. It also
is important to remember that some jurisdictions have malpractice insurance
disclosure requirements. One example
is California’s recently adopted Cal.
Rule 3-410, which requires lawyers to
tell their clients if they do not have malpractice coverage. The insurance issue
easily could morph into a disciplinary
issue if this disclosure is not made.
No two lawyer-client business transactions are the same and instead create
a wide spectrum of situations. At one
extreme is a plain-vanilla transaction,
the fairness of which is obvious and
in which there may be little or nothing
for the lawyer to explain to the client
and little civil or disciplinary risk to the
lawyer in that kind of situation. The
further one moves across the spectrum,
the more difficult it becomes for the
lawyer to demonstrate, after the fact,
that the transaction was fully explained
and fair and reasonable to the client—
as happens when a lawyer goes into
an ongoing real estate development or
investment relationship with a client.
This presents a real risk to the lawyer
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and is something to be taken on—if at
all—only with great caution.
Oasis West Realty,
LLC v. Goldman
The second recent decision, in Oasis
West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d
1115 (Cal. 2011), involved a lawyer who
turned against the client on a project
on which the lawyer previously had
represented the client. In 2004, the client retained the lawyer’s firm to obtain
all the necessary approvals for a luxury
hotel and condominium development
in Beverly Hills. In 2006, shortly before
the project went before the city council,
the firm withdrew from the matter.
Then, in 2008, after the council had
approved the project, the firm’s lead
lawyer on the deal joined a citizen’s
group seeking to overturn the approval, including soliciting signatures for a
referendum petition. This conduct led
the lawyer and his law firm to be sued
for breach of contract and fiduciary
duty and for professional negligence
by the original client.
The defendants responded with a
special motion to strike under California’s “Anti-SLAPP” statute, which
restricts lawsuits designed to discourage citizens from asserting their rights
to petition the government. The trial
court denied the motion, holding that
the suit was based on claimed breaches
of the lawyer’s duties of loyalty and
confidentiality, but the court of appeal reversed, ruling that the lawyer’s
actions involved protected petitioning
activity and that the client could not
show that it was likely to prevail on its
claims. The California Supreme Court
then unanimously ruled in favor of the
client. A presumption of confidential
knowledge arose from the existence of
the previous attorney-client relationship, and the lawyer’s duties of loyalty
and confidentiality continued even
after representation of the client ended.
Those duties were not confined—as
the court of appeal had held—to cases
involving subsequent representations
or employment or the disclosure of
confidential information; a breach can
be damaging “even if the attorney is
not working on behalf of a new client
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and even if none of the information
is actually disclosed.” Id. at 1122. An
attorney’s right to free speech does not
include using confidential information
to the detriment of a former client.
Does Oasis West v. Goldman advise
lawyers whether they can go into
business against rather than going
into business with a former client? As
a general principle, the duty of undivided loyalty prevents a lawyer from
being adverse to a current client on any
matter, whether or not related to the
subject of the current representation.
The opinion in Oasis West is a reminder
that the duty of loyalty generally ends
with the termination of a lawyer-client
relationship. What remains after the
termination is a prohibition on the lawyer’s being adverse to the former client
on the subject of the former representation. This is the first California opinion that applies the continuing duty
of loyalty to a situation in which the
lawyer’s conduct was not part of the
representation of a new client. Before
Oasis West, California law previously
was thought to be generally consistent with Model Rule 1.9(a), which
prohibits a lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a certain matter
from later representing another person
“in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person’s interests
are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”
Oasis West also is a reminder that a
lawyer may neither use nor disclose the
former client’s confidential information
obtained by the lawyer as a result of
the former lawyer-client relationship.
The opinion suggests that a lawyer may
engage in a business that is competitive
with that of a former client, but not if in
doing so the lawyer violates either the
narrow continuing duty of loyalty or
the continuing duty of confidentiality.
Can the lawyer join a firm that
represents a client who is a competitor of the former client? Yes, but with
some important limits. First, without
the consent of the former client, a
lawyer cannot be adverse to a former
client on a matter that is the same or

substantially related to a matter on
which the lawyer represented the former client. Model Rule 1.9(a). Second,
this is true if the former representation
was by the former firm, but not by the
lawyer personally, but only if while
the lawyer was at the former firm the
lawyer obtained confidential information of the former client. Model Rule
1.9(b). Third, the lawyer may not use or
disclose confidential information of the
former client. Model Rule 1.9(c).
Must a lawyer advise a prior client
about any adverse potential representation in the lawyer’s new situation?
No. There is no general requirement
that a lawyer who is leaving a law firm
must give notice to or obtain consent
from a former client when the lawyer’s
new firm represents the former client’s
competitor or is adverse to the former
client. Consent from the former client,
however, will be needed if the lawyer
will be adverse to the former client on
the subject of the former representation. Even if the individual lawyer will
not be adverse to the former client,
the lawyer must be aware that any
information held by any firm lawyer
is presumed to have been shared with
all firm lawyers. This means that if
the lawyer has pertinent confidential
information, the lawyer’s new firm
might be subject to disqualification
even when the individual lawyer is
not adverse to the former client. Applicable state law might permit the
lawyer to institute an ethics screen to
prevent disqualification of the firm
when the migrating lawyer brings
pertinent confidential information.
If a lawyer switches to another
firm that presents some potential for
conflicts, what steps might be taken to
avoid trouble? The vital first step is to
attempt to identify potential conflicts
before the lawyer moves to another
firm. The lawyer and the new firm
must be aware of the conflict to be able
to manage it.
Conclusion
The Fair and Oasis West cases remind
lawyers to always consider ethical
obligations when moving on to new
endeavors. n

